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• Protection goals — confidentiality
– Protection of the identity of a user while using a service
• Anonymity in counseling services
– Protection of the communication relations of users
• Users may know identity of each other






Everybody can be the originator of an «event» with an equal likelihood
Anonymity and unobservability
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– … tapping the «line»
– … doing traffic analysis
• Insiders
– Network operator (or corrupt staff) reading e.g. billing data
– Governmental organizations asking for log files
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Building blocks of Privacy Enhancing Technologies
• Encryption
• Hiding communication relations









– Credentials (link properties to pseudonyms)




• Against weak outsider attacks
– Encryption — does not protect from traffic analysis
– Use a mediator:
• PROXY
• Users need to trust the proxy












• Against insider attacks
– Goal:
• Users need not trust the operator of anonymizing service
– Idea:
• Use more than one «mediator» from different operators
• At least one operator must be trustworthy
– Examples:
• Broadcast
• Blind message service
• DC network
• MIX network


















Client queries for D[2]:
Index = 1234
Set vektor = 0100
Choose randomly request(S1) = 1011
Choose randomly request(S2) = 0110




Blind-Message-Service (Cooper, Birman, 1995): Query
• Protection goal:
– Databases gain no
information which entry
the client is interested in
• Replicated databases of
different operators
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Client queries for D[2]:
Index = 1234
Set vektor = 0100
Choose randomly request(S1) = 1011
Choose randomly request(S2) = 0110




Xor equals D[2]: 1100110
Answers from
Link encryption between client and databases
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DC network (Chaum, 1988)
• Everybody
1. Flip a coin with each other
2. Calculate xor of the two bits
3. If paid xor a 1 (negate the
result of step 2)
4. Tell your result
• Together
1. Calculate xor of the three
(local) results
2. If global result is Zero an








Anonymity in the Internet
Prof. Dr.-Ing.
Hannes Federrath
MIX 1 MIX 2
Mixes (Chaum, 1981)
• Basic idea:
– Sample messages in a batch, change their coding and forward
them all at the same point of time but in a different order. All
messages have the same length.
– Use more than one Mix, operated by different operators.
– At least one Mix should not be corrupt.
• Then:
– Perfect unlinkability of sender and recipient.




Year   Idea / PET system
1978  Public-key encryption
1981  MIX, Pseudonyms
1983  Blind signature schemes
1985  Credentials
1988  DC network
1990  Privacy preserving value exchange
1991  ISDN-Mixes
1995  Blind message service
1995  Mixmaster
1996  MIXes in mobile communications
1996  Onion Routing
1997  Crowds Anonymizer
1998  Stop-and-Go (SG) Mixes introduced
1999  Zeroknowledge Freedom Anonymizer (service meanwhile closed)
2000  AN.ON/JAP Anonymizer
2004  TOR





– MIX based unobservable transport system
– Should withstand strong (big brother) attacks
• Information service (impossible to operate a perfect Anon system)
– Current level of protection (Anonymity level)
– Trade-off between performance and protection should be
decided by the user
• Open source project
– Client software: Java (platform independent)
– Server software: C/C++ (Win/NT, Linux/Unix)
• Technical and jurisdictional knowledge to serve legal issues
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• For free at
www.anon-
online.de






















Sponsor: BMWA, Partners: TU Dresden, Unabhängiges Landeszentrum
für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein, FU Berlin, HU Berlin, Universität
Regensburg, Medizinische Universität Lübeck, Chaos Computer Club,
Ulmer Akademie für Datenschutz und IT-Sicherheit, RWTH Aachen,
New York University
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Public survey (Spiekermann 2003)
• Sample size:
– 1800 users of the JAP anonymizer
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! 2,5 - ! 5
! 5 - ! 15
Public survey
• Willingness to pay for anonymity
– ! 40% absolutely not
– ! 50% monthly service fee of about " 2,5 … " 5
– ! 10% more than " 5 per month
• Willingness is independent of the
heaviness of usage
• Heaviness of usage
– ! 73% heavy users (use the
system at least daily)
– ! 10% use it at least twice
the week
– ! 17% sporadic (less than twice
the week)
sporadic heavynormal




• Reasons for using an anonymizing service
– ! 31% Free speech
– ! 54% protect from secret services
– ! 85% protect from profiling
– ! 64% protect against observation by my ISP
• Do you use it for private or business?
– ! 2% private only
– ! 59% mainly for private things
– ! 30% mainly for business things
– ! 9% business only
• Why do you use the JAP system?
– ! 76% free of charge
– ! 56% secure against the operator
– ! 51% easy to use




• 150 requests randomly picked from
millions of requests of June 2005
33 % erotic, pornography
 8 % private homepages, cinema, amusement
 3 % games












1 % Rest of the world




• Dayline of May 27, 2005





















JAPs act as a forwarder node for
the Anonymizer
Also blocked
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Web request or send e-mail 















– Avg. 4-5 inquiries per month by law enforcement agencies and
private persons





– Avg. 4-5 inquiries per month by law enforcement agencies and
private persons
– Between 3 and 6 Terabytes per month of anonymized data
• Typical inquiry
– Date and time of access, IP address anonymizing service
– Inquiry: Identification request (name, address) for user behind
that IP address
• Anonymizer is misunderstood as an Internet Service Provider
(ISP)




• Typical crimes committed by use of JAP (suspicion)
– credit card fraud,
– computer fraud,




– access to child pornography
• Observation
– While the traffic anonymized by the system increased over the
time the number of inquiries did not





– There is a market for identity protection.
– Users are willing to pay for it.
• Technical
– Anonymity on the network is necessary as a basic technology for
providing freedom and democracy.
– Prototypes exist at least for Internet/Web
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